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█ Abstract If we were asked to draw a graph to represent the distribution of consciousness in the world 
around us (from dolphins to honeybees) based on objective criteria, we would definitely be in trouble. 
The two objective parameters that have been traditionally considered as a guide – the complexity of be-
havior and brain size – lead to paradoxical conclusions and turn out to be unsatisfactory, to say the least. 
We need to find novel, reliable metrics. However, these can be identified, validated and calibrated only if 
we first tackle seriously the problem of recognizing consciousness in our fellow humans, a task which is 
far from being obvious. 
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█ Riassunto La distribuzione della coscienza: un difficile diagramma cartesiano – Se ci chiedessero di trac-
ciare un grafico per rappresentare la distribuzione della coscienza nel mondo che ci circonda (dai delfini 
alle api) su una base oggettiva, ci troveremmo sicuramente in difficoltà. I due criteri oggettivi che sono 
stati tradizionalmente presi in considerazione come guida – la complessità del comportamento e la di-
mensione del cervello – conducono a conclusioni paradossali rivelandosi, come minimo, insoddisfacenti. 
È necessario individuare altre misure. Ma queste potranno essere individuate, validate e calibrate soltanto 
se prima affronteremo seriamente il problema di riconoscere la coscienza nell’uomo, un compito tutt’altro 
che scontato. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Coscienza; Animale; Cervello; Comportamento; Coma 
 

█  Plotting a chart 
 
IS SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE AN EXCLUSIVE 
privilege of humans or can the flame of con-
sciousness burn elsewhere, in this wondrous 
world that surrounds us?  
Let’s try to transform this question into 
chart form. We will put all biological and non-
biological objects that populate the planet on 
the x-axis. We could put them in random or-
der, but just for the sake of convenience we 
will sort them roughly into their reverse phy-
logenetic order: first come the humans, then 
the apes and the other terrestrial mammals, 
Studi  
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then the marine mammals, the birds, the rep-
tiles, the amphibians, the invertebrates, the 
mushrooms, the plants, bacteria and so on. 
We don’t want to leave anything out, so we 
will add inanimate objects such as crystals, 
stones, human artefacts such as telephones, 
computers, GPS and so on. The intensity of 
primary consciousness goes onto the y-axis. 
What do we mean by primary consciousness?  
The sensation we experience when watch-
ing the landscape passing by through the 
window of the train, when we are completely 
absorbed by the plot of a film, or remain cap-
tivated by the sound of the waves rippling 
onto the shore and the play of light on their 
crests. Anything that doesn’t require a special 
effort of concentration, attention or memory, 
imagination or thought, planning or choice.  
Only those who have practised medita-
tion as a rigid discipline for years can truly 
say whether it is possible for a human being 
to shake of the weight of his actions, reflec-
tions, self-awareness, but what we can say 
with a satisfactory degree of certainty is that 
experiencing a colour, a flower, appreciating 
the purity of a sound, a perfume or enduring 
pain can occur without effort, or reflection, 
or self-awareness. It is a fact that without the 
flame of primary consciousness, it is not pos-
sible to burn the reflections and twisted blasts 
of self-consciousness. This then is the funda-
mental quantity we will put on the y-axis: the 
ability to have the simplest of experiences. 
Once we have defined the variables of the 
axes, we can start with a few interesting ques-
tions. Let’s start by asking how the capacity 
to feel pain, such as burning our fingertips, is 
distributed along our x-axis. Of course, we 
could have considered the experience of 
pleasure, or the perception of red or blue.  
We chose pain as it is more effective in 
stressing the sense of ethical urgency related 
to the problem of the existence of conscious-
ness in non-human beings. How do you think 
the chart will look? Will it have a peak 
against humans and then fall precipitously to 
zero in all the other categories? Or will it be a 
straight horizontal line, a constant across all 
categories? A trend which plunges suddenly 
at the divide between the animate and the 
inanimate worlds? A curve with a more grad-
ual profile? Or maybe none of these, but an 
unexpected zigzag? Well, at present we just 
don’t know for certain. What we can say is 
that whatever the replies we give to these 
questions, they will condition the way we in-
teract with the other inhabitants and objects 
that populate our planet.  
In 1974 the American philosopher Thom-
as Nagel asked the question What is it like to 
be a bat?,1 with the aim of throwing light on 
the issue of privacy and inviolability of subjec-
tive experience. It has become a classic in phi-
losophy. We will probably never know what it 
feels like to explore the intricate depths of a 
wood winging through branches with only so-
nar to guide us, but the real problem is that we 
will never know if there is such a feeling as 
feeling something as a bat. In fact, we do not 
have a clear and shared idea of how con-
sciousness is distributed throughout the ob-
jects in the world, including animals.  
The basic issue is of course that they don’t 
speak, or more precisely, that they do not use 
a language to which we are privy. Since we 
are accustomed to attribute consciousness to 
beings that speak and communicate their 
feelings, we are immediately at a disad-
vantage when faced with the absence of a 
language that we can decode. Thus, opinions 
may vary extremely depending on whom you 
ask and this uncertainty has remained un-
changed over the centuries. See, for example, 
the radical divergence between the ideas ex-
pressed by two great French philosophers, 
Descartes and Montaigne. 
Descartes drew a sharp line between hu-
mans and the rest of the natural world. Ac-
cording to the father of the cogito ergo sum, 
verbal and non-verbal language and logical 
reasoning are the distinguishing factors that 
separate man from all the other species. Flour-
ishing the principle of parsimony (Occam’s 
razor), which holds that it is useless to look for 
more explanations than are strictly necessary 
to describe a given phenomenon, the French 
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philosopher maintained that the behaviour of 
all non-human animals can be explained with-
out calling consciousness into play.  
According to Descartes, animals do not 
communicate their thoughts, therefore their 
actions, however surprising and complex 
they may seem, are to be interpreted in pure-
ly mechanical terms. Just like the machines 
produced by mankind, animals are machines 
produced by Nature. In his Discourse on 
Method, Descartes concluded that animals 
are just mechanisms that are incapable of any 
feeling whatsoever: 
 
It is Nature which acts in them, according 
to the disposition of their organs. Similar-
ly, people recognize that a clock, which is 
composed only of wheels and springs, can 
count the hours and measure time more 
accurately than we can with all our practi-
cal wisdom.2 
 
Descartes was the first to perfect the sys-
tem of orthogonal axes (x, y), which still car-
ries his name today. Then, how would he 
have drawn the chart plotting primary con-
sciousness (y-axis) versus the objects of the 
world (x-axis)?  
Most probably Descartes’ plot would have 
been extremely simple: a gigantic peak for 
humans that fell back to zero as soon as his 
pen moved along the x axis towards non-
human primates and a straight line from 
there down to the stones, without even the 
smallest blip along the way. Very neat and 
tidy, but how would Descartes have classified 
those millions of patients who lie motionless 
in the neurological wards and rehabilitation 
centres, human beings endowed with con-
sciousness who have lost the power of speech 
and, sometimes, of reason.  
And where would he have positioned 
those who have not yet acquired the capacity 
to use speech to communicate? On which 
side of the imaginary barrier would he have 
placed children who have not yet learned 
how to communicate their thoughts?  
According to Descartes a 12 month old 
child who walks and plays in reality does not 
see and hear, but only behaves as if he sees 
and hears. Then a few months later this same 
child, after acquiring the faculty of language 
that allows him to communicate with his el-
ders and peers, is suddenly the proud owner 
of consciousness, his world is populated with 
colour, forms, sounds, joys and sorrows. Is 
this plausible?  
These are just a few of the problems that 
arise if, like Descartes, we decide to draw a 
sharp line between the conscious and the un-
conscious world. Just a few years earlier and 
very close geographically speaking, Michel de 
Montaigne formulated a position diametrical-
ly opposed to Descartes. A strong advocate of 
doubt and cultural relativism Montaigne 
loathed clear-cut distinctions and directly op-
posing positions, far preferring scepticism. He 
dealt with the question of the distribution of 
consciousness in nature and characteristically 
left all the possibilities open: 
 
When I play with my cat, how do I know 
that she is not passing time with me ra-
ther than I with her? […] Why should it be 
a defect in the beasts and not in us that 
which stops all communication between 
us? We can only guess whose fault it is 
that we cannot understand each other: for 
we do not understand them any more 
than they understand us. They may reck-
on us to be brute beasts for the same rea-
sons as that we reckon them to be so.3 
 
But this caution is only apparent! In reali-
ty, Montaigne sustained a position that in 
spite of being based on rather superficial el-
ements was by no means less extreme than 
that held by Descartes: 
 
There is a greater difference between a 
man and another man than between an 
animal and a man.4 
 
So, faced with our chart, the prudent 
French humanist would have conceded a 
comparable level of consciousness to every-
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one, men and animals alike (and maybe to 
the vegetable world for good measure). Mon-
taigne, with his ecumenical approach that 
embraced the concept of consciousness for 
all living organisms including ants and spi-
ders, enjoys a certain following today.  
Take Peter Singer, for example, a con-
temporary Australian philosopher and ani-
mal activist pioneer, who draws the line be-
tween prawns and oysters (and mussels), for 
the delight of the palates of the better-off. 
Other contemporary thinkers have gone a 
step further, sustaining the view that con-
sciousness is a property that is shared by sin-
gle cells. The problem here is that if you see 
consciousness everywhere, is tantamount to 
not seeing it anywhere. If we follow this per-
spective, any decision that we take regarding 
the delicate equilibrium that exists between 
the interests of humans and of the other ele-
ments that populate the earth, would be to-
tally arbitrary, would beg the issue and would 
probably be unjust in one way or another.  
The objective of this brief digression into 
history, which is obviously incomplete, is just 
to give an idea of the range of possible posi-
tions regarding how consciousness is distrib-
uted in nature. It is certainly worthy of note 
that the range is just as wide today as it was 
in the times of Montaigne and Descartes. If 
you ask for an informal view, most people 
will say that for them inanimate objects are 
not conscious, and only some living beings 
are endowed with consciousness. Very few 
people think that bacteria, mushrooms or 
plants have any form of consciousness, and 
worms and leaches don’t fare much better.  
The debate becomes more heated when 
the subject matter moves up the scale to fish, 
amphibians and reptiles and can become fe-
rocious when birds and mammals are dis-
cussed. It is unthinkable that the owner of a 
cat or a horse questions the capacity of these 
animals to perceive pain, while a dog owner 
feels that he cohabits with a particularly em-
pathic being that feels, processes, remembers 
and understands. On the other hand there 
are those who maintain that there is no evi-
dence of subjective experience in the animal 
kingdom, with the exception of man and 
(maybe) the great primates. There are even 
scientists who deny that the great non-
human primates suffer pain.  
To summarise, if we were to conduct a 
survey among representatives of the human 
race from different cultures, social extraction 
and religion, and asked them to draw the line 
on our chart of the distribution of primary 
consciousness, we would end up with innu-
merable different versions, with curves of 
varying form. The reason for this lack of con-
sensus is perfectly clear: until we have a fun-
damental principle on which to recognise 
and if possible measure the presence of pri-
mary consciousness in matter, we are obliged 
to reason by analogy or even worse, on the 
basis of our personal feelings and inclina-
tions. Which objective criteria should we 
adopt to recognise the presence of “someone 
who feels something” in a world populated 
by an incredible variety of beings that are not 
in a position to communicate their experi-
ences to us.  
The best way to start seems to be to ana-
lyse two aspects that can be observed without 
particular difficulty: the complexity of be-
haviour and the dimension of the brain. 
 
█  Consciousness and behavior 
 
It is perfectly reasonable to hypothesise a 
connection between the capacity to produce 
complex behaviour and the presence of con-
sciousness; indeed there are a number of fac-
tors that sustain this intuition. In the first 
place, there is the simple fact that our capaci-
ty to interact significantly with the world 
around us decreases when the level of con-
sciousness diminishes during sleep or when 
we are under the effect of an anesthetic.  
Many scholars rightly hold that within 
certain limits the observation of behaviour 
can provide indicators of the presence of 
consciousness in the animal kingdom.5 It is a 
fact that the more we observe animals, the 
greater the variety and complexity of behav-
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iour that we perceive and this is not only true 
for primates, who are genetically closer to us, 
but also for animals that are phylogenetically 
far removed from the human species, such as 
dolphins, crows, parrots, octopi and bees. 
There is little doubt that these animals, aliens 
who live in bodies and eco-systems so differ-
ent from ours, constitute the most interesting 
challenge of all so we will start by examining 
their behaviour patterns, moving from left to 
right on the x-axis of our hypothetical chart 
and descending the scale to reach the great di-
vide between animate and inanimate beings. 
Let’s start with the dolphins. There is a 
wealth of scientific and literary literature on 
the behaviour of these animals. Whoever has 
visited a dolphin house will have been able to 
form an opinion of the capacity of these ma-
rine mammals to understand complex verbal 
instructions, to imitate, learn elaborate mo-
tor sequences and work out creative solu-
tions. But what is more surprising and has 
greatly impressed scientists who have sys-
tematically studied dolphin behaviour is the 
complexity of their social interactions when 
they are in their natural habitat.6  
These mammals seem to be particularly at-
tentive to social dynamics; indeed, they seem 
to be almost obsessed with them. They live at 
an exhausting rhythm, weaving relationships, 
creating alliances, shifting alliances and be-
traying their allies. Dolphins see very little 
with their eyes, they use echo-localization in-
stead, in much the same way as bats do. Not 
only do they monitor the area in which they 
are swimming, they also eavesdrop the return 
of the impulses emitted by other dolphins, to 
get an idea of what they are seeing. Marine 
biologists are coming to the conclusion that 
behind what appears to us to be a playful and 
happy-go-lucky existence, dolphins are actu-
ally involved in a social whirl that is far more 
intricate and paranoid than many human as-
sociations.  
It seems that dolphins, like humans and 
the great apes, can recognise themselves in a 
mirror, which is a behaviour that many psy-
chologists consider to be the behavioural cor-
relate of the presence of consciousness. That 
said, it is extremely difficult to interpret the 
behaviour in front of a mirror of a dolphin, a 
being without hands or facial mimics, much 
more difficult than, say, interpreting that of a 
monkey. This is one of the reasons that the 
question of self-awareness in dolphins is still 
a subject of debate7. On the other hand, the 
most articulate behaviour is not necessarily 
the most indicative: sometimes dolphins 
blow bubbles, then they move off a little dis-
tance and turn to watch them dancing up 
through the water. Why do they do this? A 
moment of relax, a breath of fresh primary 
consciousness? Unfortunately dolphins can-
not talk to us and so we just don’t know. 
But there are other animals who do talk to 
us. Parrots, for example. Take the case of 
Alex, an African Grey who was trained over a 
period of approximately thirty years by the 
American researcher Irene Pepperberg.8 To-
wards the end of his life, Alex had acquired a 
vocabulary of one hundred and fifty words 
(similar to the vocabulary of a human two-
year old), he could count up to six, distin-
guish seven colours and six geometric forms 
and had even a grasp of some general con-
cepts such as “bigger”, “smaller”, “same”, 
“different”, “above”, “below”, and “zero”.  
He was able to categorize objects, like 
keys, independently of their colour, material 
or form, and when he was tired, he would 
say, “wanna go back”, which certainly gave 
the lie to the common saying, “learn like a 
parrot”. Alex died unexpectedly in 2007 and 
his successors have not revealed the same 
level of ability. Now, what would Descartes 
have said if he had been able to meet Alex?  
Other birds don’t speak, but show behav-
iour that we consider to be typically human, 
such as the ability to make and use utensils. 
The crows of New Caledonia, for example, 
have been known to bend a hair pin to make 
a hook that they use to extract food from a 
cylindrical container.9 This type of activity 
reveals a noteworthy capacity for discrimina-
tion and planning. Another particularly in-
teresting research study in 1995 assessed the 
  Massimini 
 
8 
ability of certain pigeons to recognise and 
distinguish the works of Picasso and Monet; 
after training they were able to distinguish 
paintings by these artists, even if they had 
never seen the paintings before.  
Going further down our scale, we come to 
the octopus, a marine mollusc with eight limbs 
and three hearts that would not look out of 
place in a far-fetched science fiction film. Is it 
really worthwhile investigating the conscious-
ness of this cephalopod that lives a solitary ex-
istence among the rocks on the sea bed?  
The answer of course is yes. The octopus’ 
behaviour indicates that it is no less worthy 
of attention than the vertebrates. Octopus 
vulgaris has a range of extraordinarily flexi-
ble behaviours, supported by a significant 
working memory and a highly developed 
power of concentration.10 It is able to distin-
guish artefacts of different weights, forms 
and dimensions, it uses objects such as stones 
and the shell of the coconut to procure food, 
to hide, to play, and is able to learn the best 
strategy (among many) to find a way out of a 
maze. Although octopi are not social beings, 
they have an extraordinary capacity to learn 
from other octopi: one particular octopus in 
an aquarium observed its neighbour opening a 
jar to extract food, and immediately imitated 
the same movements as soon as it was given a 
similar jar. Given these abilities, and other fac-
tors, the octopus has been the subject of UK 
and EU protective legislation “as there is sci-
entific evidence of their ability to experience 
pain, suffering distress and lasting harm”. 
Moving further down the scale we come 
across a swarm of bees. The social behaviour 
of these insects, (division of labour, construc-
tion and maintenance of the beehive, castes 
and task differentiation depending on age) is 
notoriously complex, even though less flexible 
than that of the dolphins. Recent studies have 
in fact demonstrated that many of the aspects 
of the bees’ social behaviour are somewhat rig-
id as they are genetically predetermined. This 
doesn’t change the fact that bees have incredi-
ble abilities, such as that of communicating 
distances and coordinates of food sources to 
other bees with extreme precision.11  
This communication is done by a figure 8 
“waggle dance”, during which the bee per-
forms waggling movements. Flowers located 
in line with the sun are indicated by a wag-
gling run in an upward direction and any an-
gle to the right or the left of the sun is coded 
with a corresponding angle to the right or the 
left of the upward direction. The distance be-
tween the hive and the recruitment target is 
encoded in the duration of the waggle runs. 
The further away the food source, the longer 
the waggle, with an increase coefficient of 
approximately 75 milliseconds for every 100 
meters. Apparently more expert bees, the 
ones who have been in the hive longest, are 
even capable of adjusting the angulation of 
their waggle dance to take into consideration 
the movement of the sun, so that the addi-
tional help is able to find the food source 
immediately. This is a really extraordinary 
achievement in a tiny object that weighs less 
than the tenth of a gram.  
This quick tour de force from dolphins to 
bees seems to suggest that, based on behav-
iour’s complexity, some form of primary con-
sciousness could be present all along. But now 
the time has come to move further to the right 
along the x-axis and to cross the divide be-
tween the animate and the inanimate. First of 
all, let us consider a GPS. Listen to that per-
suasive voice telling you which is the best 
route to the restaurant with greater precision 
than your partner does. And what about your 
laptop that never fails to beat you at chess? 
Not to mention those supercomputers such as 
Watson that can answer any question.  
There can be no doubt that these gadgets, 
that can produce language and calculations, 
would have given Descartes food for 
thought. Just imagine if he had met Alex the 
African Grey parrot and then encountered 
the supercomputer Deep Blue playing chess 
with Kasparov. At the very least he would 
have been in a quandary, as his theory basi-
cally stated that the power to speak and cal-
culate was an indication of the presence of 
consciousness. In spite of this, we are in no 
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doubt that our GPS, our laptop and Deep 
Blue are less endowed with consciousness 
than a parrot, an octopus or a bee. We would 
rate them zero in our chart, just as we would 
rate headphones, calculators and lawnmow-
ers. But hold on a minute! Why are we so cer-
tain? Just because we know that these are all 
human artefacts?  
Indeed this is the answer; we agree that 
these articles are unconscious because we 
know that their impressive performance is due 
to speed of calculation and the respect of a se-
ries of rules that we ourselves have imposed. 
But who is there to say that this might not be 
the case for many animals who show complex 
behaviour that are dictated by genetic rules?  
This is the problem with the conscious-
ness/behaviour relation: however appealing 
it may be, the mere fact that a behaviour rep-
ertoire is complex is not sufficient to clinch 
the case for the presence of consciousness. 
Indeed, it isn’t even a necessary condition. It 
would be a grave error to deny consciousness 
to a patient lying paralyzed in a hospital 
ward, or to a man happily dreaming; it is 
probably an error to deny it to a dolphin that 
has opted to pass its existence watching bub-
bles of air rising through the water. It is thus 
fair to conclude that assessing consciousness 
through behaviour is a risky choice. 
 
█  Consciousness and brain size 
 
So much for behaviour, but what about 
the other objective criteria that we can easily 
observe and measure, the size of the brain? It 
would seem inevitable that there should be 
some form of relation between the dimension 
of the brain and the level of consciousness.  
We know that in humans lesions that in-
volve large areas of the brain cause a reduc-
tion or even the total loss of consciousness, 
and that this damage is frequently irreversi-
ble. We are so sure of the general value of 
this, that we identify the death of an individ-
ual with the death of all (or almost all) of his 
neurons, so it is worthwhile reflecting for a 
moment on the relationship between the 
quantity of neurons and the quantity of con-
sciousness in the inhabitants of the biological 
universe, particularly as the dimension of the 
brain can be measured accurately.12  
A brain size-based graph, would see the 
seven kilos of sperm whale’s brain at the top 
of the scale, while at the bottom we would 
find the hamster with his one gram brain and 
the bees, an order of magnitude below. In be-
tween there is the elephant with a respectable 
five kilo brain, the dolphin with one and a 
half kilos, humans just below the dolphins at 
fourteen hundred grams, monkeys at four 
hundred grams, dogs with eighty grams and 
parrots with 6 grams. These values are hardly 
indicative of the extent of the cognitive facul-
ties, however.  
The dimension and weight of a brain 
primarily depend on the dimension and 
weight of the animal; larger animals need 
more and larger neurons, to control the basic 
functions of the host. An elephant will need 
many more receptors, sensitive neurons and 
motor neurons to control its immense sur-
face (an elephant’s skin can reach 100 thou-
sand sq. centimetres in size) and muscle mass 
(the trunk alone contains up to 100,000 mus-
cles) than a hamster. Therefore before we 
start thinking about the brain’s dimensions 
in relation to cognitive functions, one ought 
to correct for the creature’s size. 
Neuro-anatomy has solved this issue by 
using an index, known as the Encephalization 
Quotient (EQ)13 which is an approximate 
measure of relative brain size as defined by 
the ration between the actual brain mass and 
the predicted brain mass of a given animal. 
In general, in mammals the dimension of the 
neural system increases as the size of the an-
imal increases, following an exponential 
curve (with a power of approximately 0.66). 
Some species are collocated below this aver-
age curve and others above; the EQ quanti-
fies the deviation from the average.  
The idea is that the excess neurons, the 
ones that are not strictly necessary to regu-
late the somatic base functions, can be dedi-
cated to the superior cognitive functions. In 
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fact, when the EQ is adopted as the criteria 
rather than the simple weight of the brain, 
the ranking of brain size changes quite signif-
icantly. Humans shoot to the top with an EQ 
ration of 6.5, followed by dolphins (5.5), 
chimpanzees (2.6), elephants (1.8), dogs 
(1.2), parrots (1), hamsters (0.6) and last (and 
in this case least) the sperm whale with 0.26. 
However this system of measurement has its 
limits; it is only applicable to mammals, tends 
to penalise larger animals and does not take 
the number of neurons into consideration, 
which of course is a more important factor 
that the weight per se. All the same, it does 
provide a scale which is more acceptable than 
that of just the mere weight of the cerebral 
mass. So can we use it to form an idea, quan-
titative-wise, of the level of consciousness in 
the animal kingdom? It appears not. 
In fact, it is enough to consider a funda-
mental paradox that lies within our skulls. 
The head of a typical human being houses 
approximately 100 billion neurons in two dis-
tinct structures: the thalamocortical system 
and the cerebellum. The former, which is 
composed of the cerebral cortex and the thal-
amus, takes up most of the available space, 
while the latter is tucked away in the posterior 
cranial fossa, which is more or less at the level 
of the nape of the neck. It is surprising that 
this relatively small structure, which is ex-
tremely elegant and compact, contains the 
majority of the neurons. In fact the cerebellum 
is home to 80 billion neurons (neatly packed-
in) while the thalamocortical system, includ-
ing the brain stem, has only 20 billion.  
As is to be expected, the cerebellum is rich 
in resources. Its communication network is 
just as vast and sophisticated as that of rest of 
the brain, it contains the same cocktail of 
chemical substances and copes with an in-
tense exchange of information with the ex-
ternal world through the sensory and motor 
organs. It receives visual, acoustic, tactile and 
various other signals, and emits motor com-
mands that regulate many aspects of our be-
haviour. When all is said and done, it is a 
marvel of biological intricacy. The paradox is 
that the cerebellum, even with its dense neu-
ron population, has very little to do with con-
sciousness. There are certain tumours which 
can invade the cerebellum rapidly, with the 
risk that they could spread to the rest of the 
brain. In such cases, the only option is to per-
form a very radical surgery, and remove the 
cerebellum. During this operation, the cere-
bellum with its 80 billion neurons is com-
pletely lifted from the cranium and dumped 
in the surgical waste disposal unit. What are 
the consequences of such a drastic manipula-
tion in humans?  
An individual without a cerebellum is eas-
ily identifiable by the way he walks, with legs 
wide apart, gingerly and clumsily. He has dif-
ficulty in coordinating rapid movements, he 
shakes and tends to articulate words syllable 
by syllable, sometimes in an explosive man-
ner. Although such individuals have obvious 
difficulty in coordinating their movements, 
their consciousness is surprisingly unaffect-
ed.14 In fact, conscious experience in these 
patients remains as vivid and intense as be-
fore; forms, colours, sounds, smells, tastes, 
emotions, thoughts and pain, the extraordi-
nary variety of consciousness survives intact. 
In essence, the cerebellum contains 80% of 
the neurons that inhabit our cranium, but 
does not perceive light or darkness, it cannot 
see colours or feel pain and would score zero 
on the y-axis of the graph we are attempting 
to draw. In stark contrast, we know far too 
well that even a partial lesion of the remain-
ing 20% of neurons, the ones that make up 
the cerebral cortex and the thalamus, may 
abolish consciousness altogether; patients 
with severe lesions to these neurons plunge 
into coma, or the vegetative state. The simple 
fact that the thalamocortical system gener-
ates consciousness and the cerebellum does 
not, is a fundamental mystery that should 
throw light on the biological basis of con-
sciousness. For now this fact tells us that 
counting neurons, let alone measuring brain 
size, will not say much about the presence or 
absence of consciousness. Are the 20 billion 
neurons that run the elephant’s brain more or 
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less conscious than the 80 billion neurons of 
our cerebellum? Which are more effective, 
the 160 million neurons in the brain of a dog, 
or the 300 million that the octopus possesses? 
Apart from some organizational aspects 
that are common to most beings, neural cells 
and their connections form different archi-
tectures from one animal to another. The 
human nervous system is different from that 
of a dolphin, which is very different from 
that of a parrot that has nothing in common 
with the nervous system of a fish.15 The oc-
topus is a case apart, at least two thirds of its 
neurons are decentralized in its tentacles.  
Are the octopus’s 300 million neurons 
similar to the ones of our cerebellum with re-
spect to consciousness or are they closer to 
the ones of our cerebral cortex? Can one 
throw the cephalopod into the cooking pot 
with just the same lack of qualms that the 
neuro-surgeon throws the diseased cerebel-
lum into the operating theatre’s refuse?  
Difficult to say, at this stage. After all, it 
will be impossible to infer an octopus’ con-
sciousness at the bottom of the sea if we can-
not solve the basic mystery of the cerebellum, 
which is in the back our own cranium. 
 
█  First of all, consciousness in humans 
 
Indeed, the real and most urgent problem 
is that we still lack a reliable method of de-
tecting consciousness in our fellow humans. 
Though we are very familiar, via a first-
person perspective, with the transition from 
consciousness to unconsciousness and back, 
we still lack a scientifically well-grounded 
method to assess the level of consciousness of 
other individuals. How do we judge if anoth-
er human is conscious – experiencing things 
such as sights, sounds, and maybe pains?  
Usually, if we observe purposeful behav-
ior and appropriate responses to sensory 
stimuli or commands, we decide that the per-
son is conscious. If in doubt, as when some-
one is resting with eyes closed, we can ask: if 
she answers that she was thinking or day-
dreaming, we infer she was conscious. But 
sometimes matters are less clear: someone 
fast asleep shows no purposeful activity and 
will not respond to questions. If awakened, at 
times she may say she was experiencing noth-
ing; at other times that she was dreaming, 
and recalls a vivid experience. The matter 
becomes even more complicated in patients 
who suffered severe brain injuries. The bed-
side evaluation of these subjects relies on re-
peated behavioural observation by trained 
personnel. During the examination, sponta-
neous and elicited behaviour in response to 
multisensory stimulation is recorded in ac-
cordance with specific scales.16  
Regardless of the scale employed, the ex-
aminer typically looks for (1) evidence of 
awareness of the self or of the environment, 
(2) evidence of sustained, reproducible, pur-
poseful or voluntary response to tactile, audi-
tory or noxious stimuli and (3) evidence of 
language comprehension and expression. If 
none of these three defining behavioural fea-
tures can be detected during careful and re-
peated evaluations, the subject is considered 
unconscious, while patients who show non-
reflexive behaviour but are unable to com-
municate their thoughts and feelings are as-
cribed to a recently defined clinical entity, 
the minimally conscious state.17  
Thus, according to the clinical definition 
of consciousness, subjects are conscious, or 
minimally conscious, to the extent that they 
can signal that this is the case. However, 
since in patients with severe brain injury mo-
tor responsiveness is often impaired, it may 
also happen that a subject is aware but una-
ble to move or speak.18 In this case, looking 
at motor behaviour would not say much. An 
additional problem is that conscious experi-
ence can also be present in subjects who are 
disconnected from the environment on the 
input side. For example, during dreaming 
complex, temporally unfolding hallucinatory 
episodes can be as intense and vivid as wak-
ing consciousness – yet sensory stimuli are 
ignored to the point that they are rarely in-
corporated in the experience.19  
Consciousness may completely discon-
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nect from the external environment also dur-
ing some forms of anesthesia. Some dissocia-
tive anesthetic agents, such as ketamine at 
high doses, are known to induce a dreamlike 
hallucinatory state associated with sensory 
disconnection and complete unresponsive-
ness20. Similar disconnections may occur in 
pathological conditions whereby a brain-
injured subject may not respond to verbal 
commands or sensory stimuli because a pe-
ripheral or central lesion prevents sensory 
inputs from being transmitted and processed 
effectively. In all these cases, detecting con-
sciousness based on a behavioural paradigm 
may result in a significant rate of false nega-
tives. In fact, it is estimated that about 40% 
of minimally conscious patients are errone-
ously considered unconscious and thus la-
belled as being in a vegetative state.21 
Today, intensive care medicine saves 
thousands of brain-injured patients from cer-
tain death. Some of them will recover their 
ability to interact with the environment and 
communicate that they are conscious, but 
others will not. How does it feel to be an iso-
lated chunk of cerebral cortex in a sea of dev-
astation? Is it nothingness like deep sleep or 
general anesthesia? Is it nothingness like be-
ing a cerebellum? Is it a disconnected dream-
like state? Is it painful?  
It would seem that before looking for 
consciousness in the deep of the sea, behind 
the words of a parrot or in a buzzing beehive, 
we should learn to detect consciousness at 
the bedside of our fellow humans. This is not 
only an ethical obligation but also the first 
necessary step if we want to be able, one day, 
to detect consciousness among the many 
brains populating our planet. 
 
█  First steps towards an objective index of 
consciousness 
 
Whether it will be possible to develop a 
universal consciousness-meter to carry around 
the planet is difficult to say. One thing is cer-
tain: whatever metric we develop, it will need 
to be calibrated in humans first. When it 
comes to consciousness, the only control of 
the true state of affairs is somebody else’s ex-
plicit report, or even better our own experi-
ence. Take any candidate general brain-
based measure of consciousness – let’s say, 
for instance the level of activity of a particu-
lar group of neurons, or an index of global 
neural synchrony – and let’s call it M. How 
do we validate this measurement?  
There is only one way; to see how this 
measurement varies when our own experience 
changes, fades and recovers. In practice, one 
has to validate M across several physiological, 
pharmacological and pathological conditions 
on himself first and then in a large cohort of 
fellow humans who are able to provide an 
immediate (or retrospective) report about 
their subjective experience. This validation 
should start from typical conditions in which 
consciousness is present (wakefulness) or lost 
(deep non rapid eye movement – NREM – 
sleep, seizures, anesthesia) and shall then ex-
tend to more ambiguous cases in which con-
sciousness may be present albeit disconnected 
(dreaming, ketamine anesthesia).  
To the extent that this long process yields 
an index that is highly specific and highly 
sensitive for the presence of an immediate, or 
retrospective, conscious report across all 
these conditions, one may move forward; at 
this point, M should be validated in brain in-
jured patients, thus making sure that it is 
sensitive to the presence of consciousness in 
challenging cases, including patients in 
whom only some islands of brain tissue are 
preserved and who are able to provide only 
minimal signs of consciousness. In essence, 
the goal is to be able to calibrate M on a y-
axis along the spectrum from consciousness 
to unconsciousness in humans who retain 
some (even minimal) form of communica-
tion. Then, one shall apply the same meas-
urement to brains that are unable to interact 
and communicate, and just trust it. If in a 
non-communicating patient who is consid-
ered vegetative, M is as high as in a subject 
who reports experience, then one should 
conclude that this patient has a covert capac-
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ity for consciousness.  
Finally, we shall apply the same logic to 
other kinds of brain, such as the one of a par-
rot or of an octopus. It may sound exotic and 
risky, but is it more hazardous than relying 
on behaviour or number of neurons? Can we 
think of anything better? 
Recently, we have attempted to go in this 
direction by (1) devising a theory-based candi-
date index of consciousness (2) validating it in a 
benchmark population of communicative sub-
jects and (3) applying it to comatose patients. 
The first step required identifying a met-
ric that captures, among the many possible 
variables that can be empirically measured 
from the brain (levels of neuronal activity, 
levels of synchronization, and the like), the 
one that – at least in principle – may be rele-
vant for consciousness. A parsimonious ap-
proach is to start from self-evident axioms in 
order to establish what physical properties 
are fundamental for consciousness and how 
they can be measured. Naturally, in the case 
of consciousness, evidence can only be gath-
ered from phenomenology, the first-person 
observation of subjective experience itself. 
Phenomenologically, each conscious experi-
ence is both differentiated – that is, it has 
many specific features that distinguish it 
from a large repertoire of other experiences – 
and integrated – that is, it cannot be divided 
into independent components. Neurophysio-
logically, these fundamental properties of sub-
jective experience rely on the ability of multi-
ple, functionally specialized modules of the 
thalamocortical system to interact rapidly and 
effectively to form an integrated whole. 
Hence, the fundamental postulate is that con-
sciousness requires an optimal balance be-
tween functional integration and functional 
differentiation in thalamocortical networks-
otherwise defined as brain complexity.22 This 
notion implies that the complexity of brain 
activity should be high when consciousness is 
present and low whenever consciousness is 
lost in sleep, anesthesia, or coma.  
A viable and principled way to gauge the 
conjoint presence of integration and infor-
mation in real brains involves directly prob-
ing the cerebral cortex (in order to avoid pos-
sible subcortical filtering and gating) by em-
ploying a perturbational approach (thus test-
ing causal interactions rather than temporal 
correlations) and examining to what extent 
cortical regions can interact as a whole (inte-
gration) to produce differentiated responses 
(information).23 Practically, this approach can 
be applied to the human brain by employing a 
combination of transcranial magnetic stimula-
tion (TMS) and high-density EEG, a tech-
nique that allows stimulating directly a subset 
of cortical neurons and measuring, with good 
spatial-temporal resolution, the effects pro-
duced by this perturbation on the rest of the 
thalamocortical system. According to this 
proposal, a signature of consciousness is that 
the thalamocortical system should respond to 
TMS with complex, rapidly changing activity 
patterns (information) that affect a distribut-
ed set of cortical areas (integration). On the 
other hand, it can be predicted that during 
loss of consciousness, whether this is caused 
by sleep, anesthesia, or coma, the brain 
should react to perturbations with a response 
that is local (loss of integration) and/or ste-
reotypical (loss of information). In order to 
quantify the spatiotemporal complexity of 
TMS-evoked cortical activations, a novel 
empirical measure called the perturbational 
complexity index (PCI) has been recently in-
troduced. Calculating PCI involves two fun-
damental steps: (1) perturbing the cortex 
with TMS to engage distributed interactions 
in the brain (integration) and (2) “zipping” 
(i.e., compressing) the resulting electrocorti-
cal responses to measure their algorithmic 
complexity (information). The underlying 
idea is that PCI should be low if caus-
al interaction among cortical areas is reduced 
(loss of integration), because the matrix of 
activation engaged by TMS is spatially re-
stricted; PCI is also expected to be low if 
many interacting areas react to the perturba-
tion but they do so in a stereotypical way 
(loss of differentiation) because, in this case, 
the resulting matrix is large but redundant 
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and can be effectively compressed. In fact, 
PCI should reach high values only if the initial 
perturbation is transmitted to a large set of 
integrated areas that react in a differentiated 
way, giving rise to a spatiotemporal pattern of 
deterministic activation that cannot be easily 
reduced. 
For, now there is encouraging evidence 
that measuring neural complexity with PCI 
reliably detects consciousness in humans in-
dependent of behaviour and extent of brain 
lesion (or residual brain size). Empirically, this 
measure of brain complexity establishes a 
common measurement scale that is valid 
across many different conditions along the 
unconsciousness/consciousness spectrum and 
reliable at the level of single individuals in-
cluding subjects who are awake and able to 
report immediately that they are conscious, 
subjects in REM sleep24 and under ketamine 
anesthesia25 who are unresponsive but able to 
report retrospectively that they were con-
scious, subjects in NREM26 sleep or general 
anesthesia (midazolam, propofol and xenon) 
who provide no conscious report upon awak-
ening, unresponsive wakefulness syndrome/ 
vegetative state patient, and responsive brain-
injured patients who are in a minimally con-
scious state, or in a locked-in syndrome 
(LIS).27 Being validated in these conditions, 
PCI is now ready to be applied to unrespon-
sive patients; specifically, given the accuracy 
of PCI in the benchmark population, one 
should assume that finding high brain com-
plexity in a patient who is behaviourally vege-
tative indicates the presence of covert con-
sciousness, above and beyond communication 
and behaviour. These measurements only rep-
resent a first attempt, they may be invalidated 
by the next experiments and must be substan-
tially improved.  
Whether some theoretically-inspired and 
technically-refined measure of neural com-
plexity will help us drawing a sensible graph of 
the distribution of consciousness in the world 
around us is a question that is far to early to 
even ask. What is certain is that problem must 
be solved in humans first and that we need to 
be extremely careful, as many important deci-
sions will depend on the unit we choose to as-
sign to the y-axis of this fateful chart. 
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